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Abstract 
The focus of this contribution mainly falls on the relevant policy concerning care in the 
United Kingdom pertaining to older people, people with mental ill health and anyone 
else in receipt of health and/or social care services. It offers an attempt to consider 
the impact that sociology could have on improving the ethical practices of care. 
Attempts to assert rights in residential care have been challenged by a dominant 
culture that has eroded claims to citizenship. It is argued that this is due to a legal 
emphasis on regulation through care standards that has limited use because it avoids 
the realities of care. This contribution argues that a purely legal understanding of 
human rights is inadequate to address the social realities of inadequate care. The 
treatment of and provision of care for people living in long-stay institutions requires a 
human rights framework that operates socially rather than legally to recognise lived 
experiences in order to empower and emancipate. 




Those who receive care can be treated in ways that infringe their human rights in terms of 
living in discomfort, in fear, without dignity and without control. The major legislation 
in the United Kingdom (UK) relating to rights is the Human Rights Act (HRA, 1998)1 
introduced in 1998 which embeds the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
in domestic law. The HRA is reserved to Westminster meaning that it exists for the 
entire UK. In contrast legislation relating to health and care has been devolved to the 
Scottish parliament since the Scotland Act of 1998.2 Therefore, the analysis presented here 
addresses both the Scottish response, and the distinct English and Welsh response to health 
and care as related to residential care. In the UK living with degrading and dehumanising 
treatment infringes rights afforded by the HRA: specifically Article 3, the prohibition of 
torture, and Article 8, the right to respect for private and family life. This contribution will 
examine UK policy responses to these problems and review Scottish and English/Welsh 
strategies for supporting receivers of care, using a sociology of human rights to unpick 
how such infringements can occur. Though the analysis presented is based on UK experiences, 
the UK is not unique in its institutionalisation – or as many would probably prefer 
to think of it, the move to residential care – of people who receive full time care, or with 
respect to the injustices experienced in these environments. 
 
The sociology of rights is an emerging field in the UK though there have been some key 
and influential contributions. The works of Bryan S. Turner and AnthonyWoodiwiss3 stand 
out as being essential in developing the social theory behind a sociology of human rights 
and championing further work applying sociological analysis to rights. A sociological 
analysis allows the exploration of the moral values and normative structures that derive 
from and contribute to society. Thus a sociology of human rights explores how legal and 
moral frameworks of rights operate and highlights where these are lacking and leading 
to injustice or exclusion from participation in society.4 Where perhaps the social theory 
of a sociology of human rights has become stuck, is around the notion of moral relativism. 
According to Turner’s explanation5 sociology has traditionally avoided passing judgement 
on the processes that it examines in the name of positivist objectivity. If this truly be the 
case, then the scrutiny of a sociology of human rights might risk being more descriptive 
than useful. 
 
However the increase in qualitative interrogations of social structures and research 
based on feminist and emancipatory principles over the last 30 years have changed the landscape 
of sociology in the UK. Relevant to this contribution is the work conducted in the 
field of disability studies, much of which has used feminist and emancipatory paradigms 
to critically evaluate the social structures that oppress and discriminate against disabled 
people. Emerging from a political activism, disability studies was founded on the principles 
of political engagement through research. Similarly, as Turner completes his arguments 
(discussed in the opening contribution in this collection),6 it becomes clear that sociology 
can be used to critically evaluate the regulation of rights frameworks to pass judgement on 
their meaningful impact on the lives of people. This contribution considers this process with 
respect to how care is experienced in the UK. 
 
This contribution aims to build upon some key theoretical ideas around care that have 
emerged from disability studies and from feminist literature. Both consider the role of the 
carer and the cared for, though it is the feminist literature that has done most to consider the 
rights of the carer. This focus is due to the given that the majority of paid and unpaid carers 
are women. This contribution confines itself to those people in receipt of care. I explain why 
in the course of the discussion, but the analysis is nevertheless based on a simple principle, 
that the needs of carers and the rights of those in care can clash, so that both cannot be 
realised simultaneously in some cases. For example, Article 8 of the European Convention 
could be used to argue that unpaid familial carers should not be required to provide 24-hour 
support, yet this is the position that many informal carers find themselves in. So here their 
right to a family life becomes threatened, but the person who is cared for may rely on this 
level of support to access their right to family life. Further, by considering the two together, 
it can seem easy to put the onus on the carer to solve the inequalities faced by the person in 
receipt of care, but the source of the problem does not lie with the carer. Rather the source of 
the problem is more ideological and therefore it is society that must transform itself in order 
to ensure that those who receive care are not treated in marginalised and undignified ways. 
These ideas have been informed from a think tank event, held in Glasgow in April 
2009.7 The event was the fourth in a series organised as part of a knowledge exchange 
project funded by the Scottish Funding Council, looking at promoting best practice on 
equality and human rights in Scotland, the grant was held by Nick Watson (University 
of Glasgow) and Sheila Riddell (University of Edinburgh). The aim of the knowledge 
exchange programme was to provide an opportunity to open dialogue on and promote an 
understanding of the new equality and human rights agenda with key stakeholders in the 
public, private and voluntary sectors across Scotland. It also aimed to stimulate research 
on and support best practice in implementing equality and human rights policies in 
Scotland. I was instrumental in co-ordinating these events and participated as Discussant at 
the event relating to care and human rights, and some of the evidence that emerged from this 
event will be discussed. 
 
The first broad section of this contribution will establish the need to give our attention to 
the infringements of human rights that can occur in residential care settings. The focus will 
then turn to the link, often made in political literature, between citizenship and rights.8 It 
will be argued that adults living in care (rather than the wider group of those living in 
their communities and in receipt of care) are removed from the obligations and rewards 
of citizenship. Further, that this marginalisation from civil participation and recognition 
has eroded access to rights generally and human rights specifically. In support of this 
argument, UK policy relating to human rights and care will be examined, and it becomes 
clear how the former has impacted on the latter. It is argued that people in care face barriers 
to their rights. 
 
What emerges from this analysis is that the HRA is not being used as a tool to inform the 
regulation of care practices. One of the problems identified is that the HRA does not have to 
be considered by residential care providers working wholly in the private sector. This loophole 
has been addressed partially in English and Welsh policy. The final section will return 
to the notion of citizenship and question why a relatively rich and relatively democratic 
state such as the UK can recognise the need for protection of rights at the legislative 
level, but fail to manage a system whereby these rights are assumed for those living in 
care. The question of autonomy seems central to this debate in that rights continue to be 
afforded to those who are able to challenge the absence or infringement, but not to those 
who are unable. The conclusion considers to what extent the sociological study of 
human rights can and should be used to challenge this status quo, and to consider how 
all can be free to expect a threshold of rights irrespective of their conformity to the 
notion of citizen. 
 
Human rights and care 
 
As stated, this contribution will focus on adults who live in institutional accommodation 
including care homes, long-stay hospitals or respite facilities. At the think tank event, 
Gillian Dalley of the Relatives and Residents Association9 reported dehumanising and 
degrading treatment in long-stay institutions: her focus was mostly on residential care 
homes. Such examples included: the implicit and explicit discouragement of complaints; 
neglect (pressure sores, untreated heart infections, residents left in their own faeces); the 
removal and destruction of personal property; dehydration and sexual assault. The 
British Institute for Human Rights10 have also catalogued a plethora of insults against 
older adults living in residential homes including residents being given meals while on 
commodes, and left naked in rooms with the door onto a public corridor open. 
Also presenting at the think tank event, the Scottish Human Rights Commission, the 
Office for the Scottish Commissioner for Children and Young People and the Scottish 
Association for Mental Health11 revealed that older people, people with mental health problems, 
young people and disabled people can be vulnerable to this breakdown in the ethics 
of care. Within these examples people are dehumanised because they are seen as inferior, 
vulnerable or defenceless. What seems clear is that the majority of people would consider 
such treatment against themselves to be an infringement of their human rights, yet little is 
done to harness this sense of what is right and what is wrong, to challenge the care received 
by a minority (and to be clear, this is a minority of the people who receive care, many do not 
have their rights infringed). 
 
Much of the academic literature around human rights, legislation and care for people 
in long-stay institutions has focussed on the medical and legal assessments of capacity and 
procedural implications rather than on any wider implications for citizenship rights. This is 
a danger when a problem is understood in legalistic rather than sociological terms, this is an 
argument that I will return to. There is an historic debate over how concepts of citizenship 
and rights apply to people who have conditions that may affect, or are deemed to affect, 
their capacity to make decisions for themselves. These include people with a mental health 
problem, dementia and/or learning difficulties.12 Rawlsian13 concepts of social contract 
theory for example emerged from liberal political theory and argued that an individual must 
have the capacity to contribute both in terms of production and politically in order to fully 
be considered as a citizen, and afforded the rights of citizenship. The American philosopher 
Martha Nussbaum14 has used her development of the capabilities appraoch15 to criticise 
social contract theory (assuming within this critical approach that social contract theory 
describes actual social structures) for awarding status only to those who are actively contributing, 
thus marginalising those who may once have contributed but are no longer16 (older 
people), those who have not yet been permitted to contribute (younger people) and those 
who have faced barriers to being able to contribute (disabled people).17 While a contractual 
society might work well for the majority it fails to face the social barriers it creates for many. 
A claim to citizenship is often based on a fairly paternalistic concept of the rational 
man.18 Thus those considered irrational (or not male) were excluded from the rights and 
status of citizenship, and so excluded from the civil right to liberty, the political right to 
influence governance and the social rights to be seen as equal. This has consequences 
for those who receive care. According to Reynolds and Walmsley19 the situation is compounded 
because as well as not being recognised as active citizens, people who receive 
care are reduced to a state of dependency. This is because the discourse around care has 
largely focused on children, and particularly babies. As a result, it tends to be assumed 
that anyone in receipt of care has the same level of frailty, vulnerability and lack of autonomy 
as young children. Because many people who access residential care have mental 
health problems, dementia, a learning disability or other form of impairment, they are, 
on this point of definition afforded inferior status by society, and face barriers to active 
citizenship. A clear argument against this oppression could have come from the disability 
movement; however as Shakespeare20 notes, care became synonymous with oppression 
(rather than being seen as a tool for the oppression that came from dominant social ideologies) 
and was rejected from being a legitimate concern of the movement.21 
 
If care was considered by the disability movement, it was in the guise of autonomous 
independent living.22 The aim was to fight for service providers and ultimately the state to 
deliver sufficient care so that disabled people had the same freedoms as non-disabled 
people. Where this has been achieved, the rights of the person in receipt of care have a 
fairly good chance of being met. It is an empowering and emancipating solution but 
requires a particular set of circumstances to work. Direct payments have been developed 
to allow people in receipt of social care to manage this care, being given a budget to 
spend rather than direct access to care services.23 Not everyone can or wants to manage 
this. Many people who receive the level of care that has led them to choose (or have 
chosen for them) residential care are ineligible for direct payments or are unable to exercise 
autonomy or independence. But more than this, there is less control, less independence and 
less autonomy than there needs to be, and it is this erosion of recognising the individual as 
having the capacity to be an active citizen (and holder of the right to control over their 
own decisions) that needs attention. Only through this focus, will it be realised that such 
individuals have human rights, and that these are currently infringed. 
 
An emphasis on care in the community in the UK has formed a culture whereby care 
provided in long-term residential settings are seen as something that one turns to when 
all else fails. Care homes are seen as a last, and worst, resort and much emphasis in planning 
and developing social care is aimed at trying to keep people out of such institutions. The 
right to live in the community intersects strongly with the HRA, and the right to a 
family life.24 As a consequence, the rights of residents of long-stay institutions have 
been to a large extent unexplored.25 This contribution addresses these gaps. 
 
The impact of the Human Rights Act (1998) on care 
 
Though the HRA exists and can be used to fight cases, the legal process can take a great deal 
of time. A review of Scottish case law revealed that no case has challenged an infringement 
of rights experienced by someone living in residential care.26 As stated earlier Articles 3 and 
8 of the European Convention are the most relevant. Article 3’s prohibition of torture 
protects physical integrity and abolishes degrading and inhuman treatment. Where this 
has been considered in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), it has been 
concluded that such treatment would need to be commensurate with a criminal act (for 
example, actual bodily harm) to be considered. Article 8 affords the right to respect for 
private and family life. A combination of the two could be used to ensure the positive 
obligation placed on public authorities to ensure respect for physical and psychological 
dignity of individuals is not infringed.27 
 
Dalley’s28 presentation at the think tank event represented members of the Relatives 
and Residents Association and this organisation collected data concluding that in reality, 
older people living in residential care do not want to complain, many more do not feel 
empowered to use a legal route to redress, and the few people who do feel able to challenge 
degrading treatment in residential care homes often die before their legal challenge runs its 
course.29 As a result, the HRA has rarely been used in practice. Personal claims under the 
Act force people into a legal process where a knowledge of the legislation or possessing 
funds to hire a solicitor or lawyer with such knowledge is a pre-requisite for action. 
Personal claims are not the only route theHRAhas to impact on care; it is useful to consider 
the work of the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR). Following the passing of the HRA 
in 1998 the JCHR was established by the UK parliament in 2001 to scrutinise every bill to 
ensure that it did not clash with the HRA. In this way, the promise of the HRA had potential 
to infuse each bill.Yet despite the intentions of the JCHR it has not fully lived up to its promise. 
The Klug report30 reviewed the performance of the JCHR and examined the early challenges it 
made to bills working their way through the legislative process and found that recommendations 
made by the JCHR were not always implemented. In fact the Klug report claimed 
that the JCHR has little power to change bills at all. It has also been described as being 
overly legalistic due in part to the interpretation of the committee’s role to be to give 
‘“quasi-judicial” legal advice’,31 in terms of focusing on the extent to which the concise 
terms in a bill intersect with the concise terms of the HRA. The JCHR are less 
concerned with considering the likely consequences of how a bill might be interpreted once 
it has become legislation and how it will impact on real people, and then considering how 
this intersects with the Human Rights Act. In considering these legal intersections, and due 
in part to the over-representation of legal professionals (compared with the population of 
parliament) the JCHR neglects the social and economic impact of legislation.32 Despite 
these claims there is some evidence to suggest that UK legislation relating to care, since 
2001, has increasingly paid attention to rights, to dignity and to freedom of choice. The next 
section will outline some of the key and most recent legislation relating to care in Scotland. 
 
Care policy in Scotland 
 
It is clear that those who create policy in Scotland have recognised that people who receive 
care require more support to protect their rights than those who do not. If this position was 
not held, then legislation would not need to place this duty of support on health and social 
care providers. However terms such as ‘rights’ and ‘human rights’ do not feature explicitly 
in the legislation. The aim of this section is to show how ‘autonomy’ and ‘control’ have 
become important keywords infusing recent legislation around care. The concepts of 
autonomy and control have been recognised as necessary capacities in order to function 
as active citizens, but the pursuit of autonomy has replaced a pursuit of rights. Legislation 
has then opted to focus on finding ways to ‘correct’ or ‘optimise’ the individual in order to 
allow them to ‘fit in’ with society, rather than examining how society can change to accept 
the differences in people’s ability to participate. 
 
Since devolution, there have been a number of Acts designed to promote the rights of 
people who receive social and/or health care services, including those people who live in 
residential accommodation. The Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 (AWIA)33 set 
out the system for protecting the welfare of adults who are unable to take decisions for 
themselves, in Scotland. This is particularly relevant to Article 8 of the HRA and decisions 
around achieving a private and family life. Its aim is to help adults (aged 16 plus) who lack 
the capacity to make decisions on some or all aspects of their lives. It enables health care 
professionals, carers or others to have legal powers to make financial, welfare and health 
care decisions on their behalf. Thus those working closely with eligible adults can assist 
them to take control over key elements of their lives. The Act has been criticised though 
for leaving health and social care professionals unsure about how to assess capacity.34 
AWIA streamlined support provision for people considered to have no capacity or 
limited capacity to manage or choose their own provision. Crucially the Act permitted 
individuals the right to protect the control they had over their decisions and finance by 
nominating a guardian to help them make informed choices. Although the Act does not 
use the language of rights or of ‘assisted autonomy’ that was introduced by the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 (implemented in England and Wales from 2007 and discussed in the 
next section), it does provide a comparative framework and its aim is to optimise autonomy. 
The Regulation of Care (Scotland) Act 200135 has a wider remit than the Incapacity 
Act 2000, and relates to all healthcare services in Scotland (including adult, child and 
independent services). This Regulation of Care (Scotland) Act launched the Scottish 
Care Commission. This Commission works to regulate all care providers in Scotland 
using the Scottish government’s National Care Standards. There are six care standards: 
dignity, privacy, choice, safety, realising potential, equality and diversity. Though human 
rights are not specifically touted as a principal aim of this legislation, it is clear from the 
care standards that rights are a central message of this policy as it uses concepts through 
which rights are usually delivered, (for example ‘dignity’ and ‘choice’). The National 
Care Standards are used to not only assess care providers but also to assist users of care 
and support services as to how to best to optimise the service they receive. In this way 
the standards aim to trigger change through surveillance and also permit empowered 
people to utilise them on a more individual basis. For example the document ‘National 
Care Standards: Care Homes for People with Mental Health Problems’ is one of many 
documents designed to help service users understand their legal rights, and to optimise 
their awareness of how they can exercise choice and organise support arrangements.36 
Adults experiencing mental ill health have further legislative support. The Mental 
Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 200337 came into force in October 2005. It 
launched two new bodies: the MentalWelfare Commission and the Mental Health Tribunal. 
This legislation builds on earlier policies, seeking to further strengthen each person’s 
autonomy and choice. Again, the legislation was required because it was understood that 
people with mental health problems had their rights infringed in terms of being marginalised 
from active participation in making choices. Within this Act all health care users 
should be fully involved in all aspects of their care including assessment, treatment and 
support. If a person requires assistance to achieve this, then health care providers should 
grant this. If a case is to go to the Tribunal then any named person is eligible for nonmeans- 
tested legal aid. This then allows all people to use the Act and Tribunal to seek 
useful support. People with a challenge to make must still make a legal challenge, but 
the Act should remove the pre-requisite of having personal funds to support their challenge. 
The Act though does not recognise the lack of empowerment or the enforced vulnerability 
felt by many people with mental health problems who have received care, and therefore 
avoids a sociological view of the issue. 
 
Though the legislative changes made in Scotland since devolution appear to place each 
person firmly at the centre of their care provision and optimise their choices, there has been 
little work examining the impact of these policies in practice. Some work has been done 
exploring legislation relating to the same care issues in England and Wales to which the 
focus now turns. 
 
Care policy in England and Wales 
 
The equivalent English and Welsh legislation has been subjected to much greater scrutiny 
than in Scotland. For example Boyle38 has examined the Mental Capacity Act 200539 and 
how it introduced the notion of ‘assisted autonomy’, where support is required to enable the 
exercise of autonomy – an idea central to any concept of citizenship for people with a 
mental health problem such as dementia or a learning difficulty, or for younger people. 
Boyle argues that this is a useful way of considering the quality of care and of bringing 
in the Human Rights Agenda. In a study examining the quality of life of older people40 
it was found that only half of older adults felt that they were able to make decisions for 
themselves. Further the study related this lack of autonomy to the development of 
mental health problems (rather than the opposite situation of mental health problems 
leading to a restriction of autonomous behaviour). A Scottish study41 concluded that 
having control over decisions relating to autonomy and choice increased quality of life. 
These studies clearly show how essential control and autonomy are to having a sense of 
well-being. They also show how depleted a person’s sense of empowerment can become 
as their autonomy shrinks and mental health problems increase. Any legislative strategy 
that relies on the individual to make a legal challenge ignores the social reality of 
individuals in receipt of care, who can easily lose their capacity to challenge. 
 
The ‘assisted autonomy’ of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 may be sufficient to increase 
the inclusion of some adults. The notion of assisted autonomy lies in the practice of allowing 
those with impaired capacity to exploit the capacity that they do have to make rational 
decisions. Within this idea, the fact that the decision is assisted makes it no less autonomous, 
recognising that most of us make decisions with others. The issues surrounding 
people with dementia are particularly relevant here. This argument is a convincing one. 
As social beings people do generally seek the advice of others when making many 
decisions, those that impact in limited ways and those that impact more profoundly on 
us. Therefore the idea that autonomy needs to be proven before individuals are afforded 
the right to make decisions for themselves becomes an ideal to which citizens do not 
normally need to conform. Most people do not need to prove their capacity to be 
autonomous, so it is peculiar that we force certain people over this hurdle, or restrict 
their rights should they fail to comply. Further, it is a given freedom that we are able to 
make decisions that are emotional rather than rational, as adults we are generally 
allowed to make our own mistakes. Quite who determines what a ‘rational’ decision is, 
is not adequately covered by this legislation. 
 
While it is acknowledged that the move to a care home may be a positive and informed 
choice of many individuals, sometimes the decision is made by health and social care professionals 
or relatives and carers to protect an individual, and in practice the individual 
involved is excluded from the decision being made.42 The Mental Incapacity Act 2005 
was designed to alleviate the tensions created by enforced institutional care. For example, 
Dickenson43 summarised the case R. v. Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS 
Trust (1998)44 of a man who was admitted to a psychiatric hospital without due consideration 
to his wishes. His foster carers appealed on his behalf to a judicial review of the National 
Health Service Trust at the High Court, the UK Court of Appeal, The House of Lords45 
and finally the European Court of Human Rights.46 Though the House of Lord’s decided 
that the common law of necessity could justify detention; the ECtHR viewed such detention 
as a violation of human and civil rights. The Mental Health Act of 200747 attempted to close 
this loophole, thus supporting the finding of the ECtHR. What this example exposes is the 
difficulties in using a legal route: a lengthy and involved process to deliver rights that in 
practice often require to be acknowledged quickly. 
 
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 has paid due consideration to the HRA, for example 
Article 4(5) promotes the right to life consistent with Article 2 of the European Convention 
and Article 6(5) shows that forceful restraint of adults under the Mental Capacity Act could 
contravene Article 5(1) of the Convention. What is less clear is whether this legal protection 
translates into a practical and useful tool. Much of the Mental Capacity Act is framed to 
allow the detention and treatment of adults on the grounds that they lack capacity. It 
does though require a stringent focus on what capacity is and how it is limited with each 
individual. The Act usefully moves the concept of capacity from a medicalised definition 
to a socially defined concept with tests of functionality where previously tests of cognition 
were used.48 The Department of Constitutional Affairs has published a Code of Practice to 
facilitate the work of health and social care professionals to which workers are required to 
‘have regard’.49 Where an individual does not have friends or family available to consult 
with on decisions, an Independent Mental Capacity Advocate (IMCA) should be appointed 
to safeguard their interests.50 
 
However, while the mechanisms are largely available for an individual with dementia, 
for example, to have ‘assisted autonomy’ in fact, if their decision is at odds with the 
views of health and social care professionals, the paternalistic view of ‘best interests’ 
carries more weight.51 Where an adult with dementia has carers or friends available to 
advise (even if the advice is damaging to the autonomy of the individual) they are ineligible 
to receive the support of an IMCA.52 In this situation, a person whose views are at odds 
with carers or friends has no route to autonomy because they cannot utilise the IMCA. 
Yet it seems that many of the people in this situation are the most in need of this 
independent support. 
 
A further issue has dampened the impact of this legislation. Despite the Code of Practice 
published by the Department of Constitutional Affairs53 many care workers were unfamiliar 
with its guidance.54 Of course this is hardly surprising. Sociological approaches to policy 
implementation have shown that full knowledge of the law is beyond the capacity (in terms 
of working hours available to them) for front line workers. Lipsky’s55 hugely influential and 
eloquent concept of ‘street level bureaucrats’ showed too how policy implementation tends 
to be subjected to interpretation as it is assimilated into existing working practices. It is not 
surprising that those working in health and care do not possess knowledge of the law. The 
Mental Capacity Act (2005) is written so that this knowledge is assumed in order to deliver 
protection: without its knowledge, the Mental Capacity Act cannot be appropriately 
implemented. Although this legislation appears to have a positive impact, it seems clear 
that in practice some people’s rights and autonomy are not respected. 
 
Regulation of care in the United Kingdom 
 
Palmer56 is careful to stress that part of the problem lies not with the legislation per se, but 
with many care and health services being provided by the private sector (including voluntary 
and charitable sector): a product of thirty years of privatisation and out-sourcing.While 
the standard of care offered by the private sector can be excellent there is some concern that 
it is not subject to the stringent scrutiny of public sector provision.57 
The key difference is that private enterprises aim to make profit and this potentially is a 
priority over providing care and dignity (this is not true for many residential homes 
managed in the private sector, the argument though, is that it can be). In order to ensure 
care and dignity then, the government must scrutinise and measure service delivery (for 
example via the Scottish Care Commission); Palmer58 however, suggests that this is not 
done well. Where local authorities fund services run by the private sector, the private 
sector should pay due regard to the legislation that impacts on the public sector, for 
example, HRA, the Equality Act 2006 which synthesised existing anti-discrimination legislation 
including that related to age,59 and so on. But there remains concern about the extent 
to which the performance of the private sector is adequately monitored. Where cases have 
been taken to a UK court under the HRA, against private sector bodies providing public 
sector services, the court has generally ordered that private sector bodies should not be considered 
bound by the HRA. Perhaps not surprisingly the JCHR were not happy with this 
judicial interpretation of the HRA but did not directly challenge decisions.60 This trend 
of dismissing claims made under the HRA extends to all cases heard by the House of 
Lords. Since October 2000 (when the HRA became enforceable) only 27 per cent of 
cases have been upheld (35 of 132 cases).61 
 
In response to the case YL v. Birmingham City Council and others,62 the House of Lords 
ruled in 2007 that: 
. . .a privately owned care home, operating on a for-profit basis and acting pursuant to a contract 
with a local authority could not be deemed to be a hybrid public authority under section 6 (3)b 
of the HRA.63 
 
Thus care received in a placement funded by the private sector need not give regard to 
human rights under British law, the preservation of autonomy or dignity, and can ignore 
the right to freedom, because they are orientated towards making profit. The Health and 
Social Care Act of 200864 does go some way to address this issue, and operates in Scotland 
and England andWales to ensure that care funded by the state (whether it be in state-owned 
or privately-owned care homes) is protected by the HRA.65 The important point to draw 
from this is that many people who live in residential homes may assume that they do not 
have rights, or the protection of the law, because some people do not. Thus a culture pervades 
of being unable to challenge degrading treatment, and of having limited autonomy, 
even though some people receiving state-funded care are able to legally challenge this. 
 
In pursuit of autonomy 
 
Notions of autonomy pervade legislation around care but at the cost of a full discourse on 
rights. The advances in legislation to help protect the quality of care given to those in our 
society that are dependent upon it, is perhaps proof that culturally and socially the UK is 
organised and run in a way that excludes care, benevolence and those in receipt of care 
until the needs of the majority have been met. This is perhaps aligned to Nussbaum’s66 
argument that the design of public spaces continues to exclude disabled people, thus 
promoting the idea that disabled people are not the public, they are not to be counted or 
considered as relevant. 
 
Thus, and as noted earlier, on a point of definition, people who receive care are given an 
inferior status. Further, equality has not been built into UK systems as those in receipt of 
care are not presented culturally, socially, or politically as equals. So re-balancing this 
power requires a different response than more legislation. More legislation would entrench 
the assumption that legal redress is the only route to the acquisition of rights. It has been 
argued in this contribution that this route is not accessible for many. A greater focus on a 
sociology of human rights can be used to highlight the inadequacies of this UK legal 
system, and create pressure to use human rights to create a threshold of care where 
inhuman and degrading treatment cannot occur. In the current system, rights need be 
infringed before someone is entitled to make a costly, lengthy, laborious and intimidating 
legal challenge. A new implementation of the HRA could ensure that the ethics of care 
transcend the realities of financial cut-backs, uneducated carers and undignified treatment. 
This could be monitored through current regulatory frameworks such as the UK-wide 
Equality and Human Rights Commission, or the Scottish Mental Health Commission, 
rather than relying on individuals making legal challenges. 
 
What is needed is an ethical examination of the tension between autonomy and 
dependency. The two concepts seem placed dichotomously with autonomous decisions 
only managed through advocacy. Such manipulation is unnecessary: all people are at once 
autonomous and dependant. As a society we should try to apply this fluidity in order to 
recognise people who are cared for as being active citizens. The dichotomous approach 
carries weight in practice: if a person needs care, and particularly if the state is asked to 
pay for it, then that person cannot be autonomous. And it is this fatalistic message that has 
essentially eroded the application of the HRA and prevented its impact on care. 
 
Shakespeare67 clarified this argument when critiquing the disability movement’s fight to 
end dependent care structures. These are socially created structures that have marginalised 
the support of disabled people outside of the mainstream (for example, special education).68 
The medical model is used to describe a reality where disabled people were marginalised 
from making their own decisions. Rather medical and social care professionals were 
considered to have the expertise and subsequent power to place disabled people in 
institutions.69 The disability movement challenged this approach and fought for the 
empowerment of all disabled people. Oliver, Finkelstein and others70 campaigned politically 
and through academic literature for a move towards independent living.71 Within 
this literature, autonomous living was seen as attainable if only social structures permitted 
it. For example, direct payments (a system whereby eligible adults had control over their 
own social care budgets so that they could choose and manage their care support) were 
used as a system of emancipating disabled people from institutional care.72 For some, 
this transition from dependent to autonomous living is vital, but for many care and dependency 
is vital and necessary. For example, it has been argued73 that independent living will 
not suit the needs of most people with intellectual disabilities. 
 
But Shakespeare74 begins an argument that needs further focus. He says that neither 
autonomy nor independence are requirements for care that optimises rights, respect and 
dignity. Therefore this over-scrutiny of the wits of those in receipt of care allows us to 
bypass the duty of care that befalls society. I would agree. To impose a situation where 
adults in care must be rational and autonomous in order to be given the rights of citizenship 
(and subsequently the right not to be degraded or dehumanised) is to require something 
more of them than most of us need to live up to. This happens because the legislation 
necessarily uses a legal framework, where people are categorised as being in need of 
help (inferior status). A sociological understanding is needed to move away from legalities 
and consider morals and inform the public policy debates. 
 
Tronto75 has argued that the principles of rights have remained as regulations and rules, 
beautiful concepts that have failed to impact on the ethics of care. Human rights should 
influence care in a practical sense, but must first escape from its legal basis, and be 
applied meaningfully perhaps via a collective awakening to social responsibility.76 This 
process is a social one. We must not be caught in dominant understandings of citizenship 
that emphasise notions of autonomous individualism.77 The absence of reciprocity in a care 
relationship only matters when examining the individual, but a sociology of human rights 
allows us to look at our collective attitudes, and to our moral responsibility to ensure that 




In conclusion, there has been a proliferation of policy from both the Scottish parliament at 
Holyrood, and the UK’s parliament in Westminster that has sought to protect and enhance 
the rights of people living in the UK. The implementation of these policies has been 
problematic however. As has been demonstrated, the HRA has helped maintain a legalistic 
approach to rights in the UK and rarely to regulate the Acts that have been passed since 
2001. However this legalistic focus has failed to examine the extent to which new legislation 
may infringe the rights of people in practical terms because it fails to examine 
their social and economic impact. Legislation relating to health and social care has gone 
a long way to improving the rhetoric around the support of people who rely on such 
services, however as many workers at the grassroots level are still unclear about legislation, 
its impact must be limited. Part of the reason for this may be the number of policies that now 
exist to support a minority of the population. It is unfeasible that some of the lowest earning 
workers in the UK (that is, care workers) should in their spare time (for they are often paid 
to care by the hour) become familiar with the Human Rights Act, the Equality Act and the 
Mental Incapacity Act and so on. 
 
Can human rights be extended in scope to improve autonomy, choice and dignity for 
people in receipt of care? It is a pressing problem for society in the UK. As social research 
and every news item on ageing informs us, it is a problem that is getting worse as the UK 
will soon have more people post-retirement age than in any other time in history. But the 
problems usually get framed in terms of ‘costs’. Rather, sociology should have something 
to say about the experience of care and the impact that the relegation of people into a substatus 
category has on us all. Allowing the most marginalised in our society to live with 
rights empowers us all to recognise that we live with rights. Ensuring that people whose 
rights are infringed can and do challenge their environments will lead to an expectation 
by all that some degrees of degradation are unacceptable. Rights are the route to ending 
the dehumanising, undignified and un-autonomous lives lived by many people in receipt 
of care. Once this is ended, the stigma of care will no longer have its impact. Perhaps 
even the disability movement will be able to accept the reality that many people live with 
the reality of care: care will no longer be a dirty word. 
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